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The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
the Post-Lisbon European Union
Jennifer W. Reiss*
intrODuctiOn
A recent development in European law, less heralded, but no less path-breaking than the Treaty of Lisbon, was the ratification by 
the European Union (EU) of its first human rights 
treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Concluded as a 
mixed agreement, the CRPD’s pioneering monitoring 
mechanisms demand a high level of cooperation from 
both the EU and its Member States. As the Treaty of 
Lisbon fundamentally changed the frameworks by 
which the European Union’s institutions operate,1 
the EU (at the time, still the European Community) 
formally participated in the negotiation of its first 
international human rights treaty, the CRPD.2 But 
the CRPD is a breakthrough in more ways than 
one: the CRPD is the first United Nations human 
rights treaty of the 21st century;3 it adopts a modern 
“social model” of disability4 to explicitly recognize 
the legal rights of the world’s largest marginalized 
group,5 and in a break from its predecessor treaties,6 
the CRPD contains novel provisions for implementa-
tion and monitoring,7 which portend a “progressive[] 
reconfigur[ation] of the structure and process of 
human rights oversight.”8
The CRPD provides for a treaty monitoring body (the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) with an 
international Conference of States Parties to monitor periodic 
State reports and to issue general recommendations, and it 
is supplemented by an Optional Protocol under which it can 
receive individual or collective complaints.9 But these traditional 
functions and institutions are underpinned by the requirement 
to establish national “focal points” to facilitate and monitor 
steps taken by national and sub-national organs to fulfill the 
Convention. This requirement — a first in international human 
rights law — effectively charges a named government body 
with oversight of CRPD compliance. The CRPD also requires 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations, which it is 
hoped, will be facilitated by these organizational centers. The 
CRPD thus revolutionizes governments’ accountability to the 
international community.
This unusually activist stance from the UN on monitoring 
and implementation has already grabbed the attention of aca-
demics and policy-makers.10 In Europe, however, the questions 
posed by the CRPD go far deeper than merely how to more 
effectively translate treaty commitments into practice. The con-
clusion of the CRPD by both the EU and independently by its 
Member States as a mixed agreement generates questions about 
the nature and future of European integration in the context of 
expanding EU authority and Member State rejection of formal 
constitutionalism.11 How will the EU and Member States imple-
ment Convention duties in areas of shared competence? As the 
Commission begins to implement a Code of Conduct under the 
Convention,12 the practical effectiveness of the Convention within 
the EU is at stake. Unless the current Code is revised to provide 
a concrete formula by which responsibility is divided and action 
taken, the CRPD will remain merely an empty promise of equal 
rights for the disabled.
This article proceeds in three primary parts: section one 
briefly describes the substance of the CRPD, section two situates 
its adoption in the context of European Union law, and section 
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Signing of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2007.  
Source: UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras
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three recounts and critiques the Code of Conduct which ostensibly 
governs how the EU will fulfill its obligations.
prOvisiOns Of the cOnventiOn On the rights Of 
persOns with Disabilities
Substantively, the CRPD obligates signatories to go beyond 
the mere provision of non-discrimination legislation and address 
the full panoply of civil, political, economic, and social rights 
through the lens of disability. Underlying principles animating 
the Convention explicitly include individual autonomy, and “full 
and effective participation and inclusion in society.”13 Article 4 
of the CRPD requires active and comprehensive state engage-
ment in the human rights of disabled persons. This obligation 
is then supplemented by specific provisions in Articles 5 to 30, 
which touch on traditional elements of the human rights agenda 
— de facto equality, the right to life, judicial access, freedom 
from torture (or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment), 
privacy, rights to home and family, education, employment, and 
participation in public life, among others — as well as more 
specific concerns of the disabled community, including: acces-
sibility, independent living, rehabilitation, and personal mobil-
ity. The last section of the convention includes articles dealing 
with logistical issues: data collection, international cooperation, 
reporting, and monitoring.14
Without negating the applicability of pre-existing human 
rights instruments,15 the CRPD is in essence a bill of rights for 
the disabled community, reaffirming that impairments do not 
negate fundamental protections accorded to persons by virtue 
of their basic human dignity. In this sense, one could argue that 
the CRPD should require little accommodation in national legal 
systems. Presumably, signatories like the EU, which are already 
active in protecting the human rights of its citizens, have gener-
ally applicable laws in place. The difficulty lies in the disability-
specific provisions — the core of the Convention — which are 
designed to mainstream disabled persons and address the existing 
human rights gap engendered by their exclusion from the general 
population. Governments will have 
to review nearly the entire corpus 
of existing law for lacunae ignor-
ing the needs of the disabled, from 
signage on buildings and making 
public information available 
through assistive technologies 
to specialized training for social 
services employees and the pro-
vision of cultural materials and 
sports activities in accessible for-
mats. Indeed, the CRPD would be 
superfluous if it did not alert gov-
ernments to, and compel action 
on those dimensions of human 
rights protection they have thus 
far failed to address from a dis-
ability perspective. However, the 
sheer pervasiveness of the neglect 
the CRPD addresses makes its 
implementation substantially 
more complex than other human 
rights instruments.
“[T]he CRPD is in essence a bill of rights for the disabled 
community, reaffirming that impairments do not negate 
fundamental protections accorded to persons by virtue  
of their basic human dignity.”
All-wheel minibus used for public transport in the mountain valleys of Switzerland, 2011.  
Source: Flickr user Kecko
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aDOptiOn by the eurOpean uniOn
Added to the immense task described above are the multiple 
layers of responsibility and accountability in the EU’s supra-
national system — where Member States have exclusive legal 
competences, the EU has exclusive legal competences, and there 
is a vast interstitial space of shared competences — as well as 
the notion of legal clarity becomes more than a desirable end of 
CRPD obligations, but essential to its implementation.
In brief, powers — or com-
petences — can be exclusive 
or shared (whether internal to 
the EU or in its external rela-
tions with non-member states).16 
According to Article 2(2) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), in areas 
of shared competence the Member 
States are only free to act to the 
extent that the EU has not done 
so. There is also a lesser form of 
“supplementary” competence for 
the EU to support or coordinate 
Member State actions, provided 
for in Article 2(5) TFEU. It should 
be noted that the TFEU explicitly 
includes the principles of “sincere 
cooperation” and “mutual respect” 
in the exercise of delineated com-
petences, meant to reinforce the 
essentiality of loyalty between the 
EU and the Member States for 
effective action in a cooperative 
federal structure.17
Concluding treaties like the 
CRPD as “mixed” agreements 
— i.e. jointly by the EU and its 
Member States — has been the 
norm when some of the mat-
ters covered by the agreement 
fall outside the EU’s competence, 
or because in respect of matters 
for which competence is shared, 
the Member States have chosen 
to act under their own powers 
rather than through the Union.18 
Mixed agreements are necessary 
to maintain the practical effectiveness of a cooperative fed-
eralist system,19 but they are also politically useful given the 
inherent volatility of this governance style.20 Thus far, mixed 
agreements have tended to involve discrete issues, like humani-
tarian aid, nuclear safety, and participation in the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety.21 Because it does not impose a strict 
competence structure on the Commission and Member States, 
mixed agreements offer the space to experiment with creative 
modes of governance — especially when dealing with convo-
luted shared competences. Indeed, the Union has already begun 
experimenting with inventive modalities for managing shared 
competences that may be importable into the mixed agreement 
context.
For example, Council regulations now require Commission 
observation of bilateral air service agreements, and encourage 
the acting State to include standardized clauses drafted by the 
Commission in conjunction with the Member States.22 In multi-
lateral agreements “disconnection” clauses have been added not-
ing that EU law on point prevails 
over the international agreement 
inside the Union, but does not 
affect individual Member State 
obligations.23 Another option 
is the so-called Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) a ‘soft 
law’ mechanism which stresses 
decentralized, voluntary, mutual 
learning via the setting of guide-
lines, timetables, and benchmarks 
for achieving generalized goals, 
often announced by the European 
Council, which are then trans-
lated into specific national poli-
cies tailored to circumstances in 
Member States. The intention is 
that civil society and stakehold-
ers are involved in this debate 
and initial policymaking. These 
policies are then subject to peer 
review with the objective of 
exchange of best practices and 
thus gradual harmonization of 
EU objectives without resort to 
legislative or regulatory dictates 
in sensitive policy areas.24
With that context in mind, 
appended to the Council Decision 
concluding the CRPD on behalf of 
the European Union is a declara-
tion of the powers of the Union vis 
à vis the Member States.25 Many 
of the CRPD’s obligations clearly 
engage shared and supplementary 
Union competences, particularly 
in terms of CRPD Articles 9 and 
20 on accessibility and personal 
mobility, respectively. Ostensibly then, this document should be 
the foundation for any further exploration of dividing powers 
under the Convention. Unfortunately, it is not very helpful. The 
powers of the Union are very general ones, relatively apparent 
from a plain reading of the CRPD. The EU specifies exclusive 
competence regarding its own public administration and shared 
or supplemental competence in areas where it is provided for in 
the TFEU, such as transport, discrimination on the grounds of dis-
ability, employment and vocational training.26
The Decision does include an additional appendix to “illus-
trate” existing Union legislation relevant to matters covered by 
“One must remember 
that delineating powers 
in the case of the CRPD 
means so much more 
than horse-trading in the 
bland ‘Eurospeak’ of a 
Brussels bureaucrat. It 
directly translates into 
political responsibility 
and — more importantly 
— accountability to fill 
one of the last true gaps 
in European human 
rights law.”
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the Convention, including seventeen items on accessibility, nine 
on employment and social inclusion, eight on mobility, five on 
access to information, five on data collection, and three on rel-
evant aspects of international cooperation. However, (1) this list-
ing may or may not be comprehensive and (2) interested parties 
are left to investigate each of the forty-seven acts independently 
to assess the extent of the EU and Member States’ comparative 
undertakings. Moreover, the document is somewhat biased in 
emphasizing the EU as the predominant actor. Although it might 
have been appropriate to include some discussion of what is 
clearly Member State competence as a counter-point to elucidate 
the declaration of the EU’s 
competence, there is no 
such explicit discussion of 
what might be exclusively 
the province of the Member 
States.27
Many of these instru-
ments have as their legal 
basis in Article 114 TFEU 
— the European ‘commerce 
clause’ empowering the EU 
to adopt harmonizing legisla-
tion in support of the internal 
market.28 This is noteworthy 
because the article is sub-
ject to extensive qualifica-
tions pursuant to political 
concerns of the Member 
States, which further com-
plicates the question of who 
is responsible for attend-
ing to the needs of disabled 
consumers. Comprehensive 
implementation will clearly 
take time, resources, and ultimately, political capital within the 
Commission. When seen in that context, the opaquely announced 
division of competences becomes somewhat understandable. 
However, one must remember that delineating powers in the case 
of the CRPD means so much more than horse-trading in the bland 
‘Eurospeak’ of a Brussels bureaucrat. It directly translates into 
political responsibility and — more importantly — accountability 
to fill one of the last true gaps in European human rights law. 
Delineating competences means that the paraplegic knows where 
to turn when she is denied access to public transport, it means that 
the schizophrenic can petition to be cared for by his family, rather 
than locked in an institution, and it means that autistic children 
can no longer be marginalized or excluded from a real education 
as a burden to the public. There are palpable consequences of the 
path the EU decides to take.
the cODe Of cOnDuct
In late 2010, the Council, Commission, and Member States 
adopted a Code of Conduct with the primary purpose of describing 
the function of the Commission as the focal point for imple-
mentation of the CRPD (in accordance with Article 33(1) 
of the Convention).29 With the inventive monitoring and 
implementation provisions of the CRPD, the United Nations 
has engaged itself in a quest for continued effectiveness for 
the international human rights regime. In the Convention’s 
Code of Conduct, the EU had a similar chance to innovate, 
develop new governance mechanisms, and enhance its ability 
to fulfill its growing responsibilities in the human rights field. 
Unfortunately, the Code of Conduct leaves much to be desired.
The document is preoccupied foremost with management 
within the UN monitoring context but not truly with the divi-
sion of responsibilities between the levels of governance. 
Coordination meetings may 
be convened on the subject 
of any type of competency 
prior or concurrent to UN 
committee meetings, with 
referrals on subjects of either 
shared or exclusive Union 
competence to a Disability 
High Level Group. In the 
event of Member State 
competence over a given 
subject, “coordinated posi-
tions” may be expressed by 
either the EU Presidency, 
an appointed Member State, 
or by mutual consent the 
Commission, who will also 
speak in cases of exclusive 
Union competence.30 In 
shared competence, deter-
mining who will make state-
ments on behalf of the EU is 
an issue of “the preponder-
ance of the matter,” a term 
which is left undefined.31 
Only in the event of deadlock on shared competence combined 
with a pressing UN deadline is there provision for anything 
but the same vague standards suggested by the EU documents 
concluding the CRPD. Disagreements are referred to relevant 
Council Working Groups designated by the Presidency and as 
a last resort, to the Permanent Representatives Committee, who 
will vote on the matter in accordance with the EU voting rules 
assigned to the subject.32
If the EU is serious about its obligations under the Convention, 
the current Code of Conduct is not enough. The plight of the dis-
abled is not going to be ameliorated by streamlined procedures 
in New York or Geneva. A better Code would not skirt the issue 
of competences, but instead establish precise circumstances 
under which the procedures for managing competences are 
triggered and initial steps are outlined to move from obligation 
to legislation. And to do so, it would adopt a discursive focus: 
establishing pathways for information sharing and consultation, 
but couching it in the firmer legal approach adopted by the EU’s 
existing coordinating Regulations.
For example, the key provision in a revised Code should 
stipulate that the entity to which an issue of compliance is first 
presented — whether the Member States or the Commission 
“If the EU is serious about 
its obligations under the 
Convention, the current Code 
of Conduct is not enough. 
The plight of the disabled is 
not going to be ameliorated 
by streamlined procedures in 
New York or Geneva.”
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— shall notify all appropriate focal points33 either of (1) the 
action proposed by that body to address compliance in accor-
dance with an express competence or (2) the concern that 
compliance would be better served by action at another level of 
governance. In the latter case, a proposal or opinion on further 
conduct should be appended. This procedure would have to have 
some appropriate time limitation.
CRPD focal points of nations affected by the proposed 
action can then craft a response to the notification. If there is 
agreement between the Commission and the Member States 
in competency or method, the notifying focal point would be 
authorized to proceed. If there is disagreement, the initial noti-
fication would act as a binding agreement to enter into mutual 
discussions on the issue. Efficiency and effectiveness would be 
served by forcing participation in the cooperative procedure, so 
neither the Commission nor the Member States can shirk diffi-
cult questions. It also provides a forum for information sharing 
on better methods and unintended consequences. Discussions 
could trigger notification to and response from the European 
Parliament to increase democratic participation and the breadth 
of expertise available.
There should also be clarity in the procedures regarding what 
would happen if negotiations deadlocked. The CRPD obliga-
tions are obviously ongoing, and thus to be a good global citi-
zen, the EU could not just leave the issue unresolved, however 
politically prudent that may be. The EU’s judicial cooperation 
regulations34 seem to provide for a final resolution in favor 
of the Commission in such cases by replacing the open-ended 
supervision provided for by earlier laws.35 A fairer and more 
definitive solution may be to provide for referral to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union for an Advisory Opinion on the 
Union powers in controversy after some extended time (such a 
provision would also respond to a potential critique of lack of 
judicial oversight, without necessarily encumbering innovation). 
The conceivable existence of a permanent deadlock in negotia-
tions between Member States and the Commission was a key 
point that the Court of Justice left unresolved after the case of 
Commission v. Sweden.36
Finally, to be prudent, a revised Code of Conduct would 
include review and expiry provisions, with perhaps a five-year 
limit and explicit provision to send the review report to the UN 
CRPD Committee for consideration. If anything, such proce-
dures should be welcomed at the United Nations as improving 
the probability of compliance with the substantive provisions, as 
well as buttressing the establishment of the local focal points so 
key to the Convention’s innovative approach.
A further delineation of areas of competence — complete 
with existing affected legislation and proposed additional acts 
in both the EU and Member States — is useful if the EU is seri-
ous about effectively implementing the CRPD. In other words, 
without a dualist-style strict division of powers, the onus is on 
the EU and Member State institutions to behave themselves: to 
agree on the extent of the responsibilities on each side, ensure 
that the network of responsibilities is comprehensive, and stand 
by the agreed responsibilities. A precise declaration of compe-
tences keeps both sides honest. That said, it may not be realistic 
to create a straight recital of competences when the legal impact 
of the CRPD is so pervasive, but something more than the cur-
rent Code is clearly warranted.
cOnclusiOn
The Treaty of Lisbon is part of an ongoing constitutional 
process between the European Union and Member States. 
Increasingly, those “two levels of government are [seen as] 
complementary elements of one system” existing “in permanent 
interdependency,” which places the interests of individual citi-
zens — rather than the state — at the center of its constitutional 
universe.37 Seen in that light, the concurrent advent of Lisbon 
and the CRPD is powerful. As the international human rights 
system continues to mature and recognize a fuller conception of 
individual dignity, perhaps unconsciously, the European Union 
is moving in a direction that aligns concrete political institutions 
with that vision. Nevertheless, the fulfillment of citizen-centered 
governance depends in large part on the cooperative ethos and 
notion of mutual responsibility suffusing Europe’s chosen style 
of federalism. The EU’s institutions must collaborate.
This obligation is especially profound in external relations 
agreements like the CRPD. In establishing the concept of “focal 
points”, the UN has recognized that clarity of responsibility and 
coordination of national action within international organizations 
is key to effectiveness: mere general mandates and reporting 
are insufficient to ensure accountability. Although Lisbon 
improves coordination on external action with the new unitary 
role of High Representative, a coordination problem remains 
outside the area of common foreign and security policy.38 
Legislating mutual consultation in the management of shared 
“[T]he fulfillment of citizen-centered governance 
depends in large part on the cooperative ethos and notion 
of mutual responsibility suffusing Europe’s chosen style 
of federalism. The EU’s institutions must collaborate.”
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Endnotes: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Post-Lisbon European Union
1 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 Dec. 2007, 
2007 OJ (C 303) 1. Further references will be made to the con-
solidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union [18 May 
2008, 2008 OJ (C 115) 13] and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [18 May 2008, 2008 OJ (C 115) 47] incorporating 
the Lisbon Treaty changes [hereinafter TEU (AA) (‘as amended’) 
and TFEU respectively]. Similarly, for clarity’s sake, this paper 
adopts the post-Lisbon nomenclature; the ‘European Union’ (and 
derivations thereof) will be substituted for reference to all precursor 
organizations unless absolutely necessary.
2 See generally, Gráinne de Búrca, The European Union in the 
Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention, 35 eur. L. rev. 174 
(2010).
3 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
G.A.Res. 61/106, UN GAOR, 61st Sess. Supp. No.49, UN Doc. 
A/RES/61/106/Annex II, at 65 (13 December 2006) [entered into 
force 3 May 2008; hereinafter CRPD]. As of August 2011 the 
CRPD has 149 signatories with 103 ratifications; the EU and  
all EU Member States have signed, and the EU ratified on 12 
December 2010. See UN Enable, Convention and Optional Protocol 
Signatures and Ratifications, http://www.un.org/disabilities/ 
countries.asp?navid=12&pid=166 (last visited 19 Aug. 2011).
4 For an overview of the social model of disability and its  
contrast to the traditional medical model, see Michael Ashley Stein, 
Disability Human Rights, 95 caL. L. rev. 75, 85-93 (2007).
5 Gerard Quinn, A Short Guide to the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 1 eur. Y.B. DisaBiLitY L. 
89, 89-90 (2009).
6 These include, the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide 
(1948), the International Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant of 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (both 1966), the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1979), the 
Convention against Torture (1984), the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1989), the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families 
(1990) and the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006).
7 CRPD, supra note 3, Arts. 33-40. For a primer on traditional 
monitoring systems for UN human rights treaties, and critiques 
thereof see PhiLiP aLston & James crawforD eDs., the future of 
un human rights treatY monitoring (2000); see also Off. UN 
High Comm. for Hum. Rts [OHCHR], Expert Paper on Existing 
Monitoring Mechanisms, Possible Relevant Improvements and 
Possible Innovations, UN Doc. A/AC.265/2006/CRP.4 (16 Jan. 
2006); UN Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, National Institutional 
Frameworks and Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN 
Doc. A/AC.265/2006/CRP.5 (14 Aug. 2006). Other relevant UN 
Studies and Reports are accessible at http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/issues/disability/documents.htm. For an overview of the  
various monitoring mechanisms in the CRPD, see Michael Ashley 
Stein & Janet E. Lord, Monitoring the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities: Innovations, Lost Opportunities, and 
Future Potential, 32 hum. rts Q. 689 (2010).
8 Id. at 690.
9 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, G.A.Res. 61/106, UN GAOR, 61st Sess. Supp. 
No.49, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106/Annex II, at 65 (13 Dec. 2006) 
[entered into force 3 May 2008].
As of August 2011, the Optional Protocol has 90 signatories with 
62 ratifications — not including the EU, although there is a pending 
proposal to sign. See Commission Proposal for a Council Decision 
Concerning the Conclusion by the EC of the CRPD, COM (2008) 
530 final (Feb. 2008).
10 See, e.g., Stein & Lord, supra note 7; Presentation by Gerard 
Quinn to the Parliament of New Zealand, 19 Feb. 2009, http:// 
www.odi.govt.nz/documents/convention/20090219-gerard-quinn-
address-comvoices-breakfast.doc (last visited Oct. 11, 2010); 
European Disability Forum, EDF Contribution to the UNOHCHR 
Thematic Study to Enhance Awareness on the Structure and Role 
of National Mechanisms for the Implementation and Monitoring  
of the CRPD (September 2009) www.def-feph.org (last visited Oct. 
11, 2010).
11 Council Decision 2010/48/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 23) 35. The 
Commission is designated as the “focal point” for coordination 
under the CRPD. Id., Art. 3. See Delia Ferri, The Conclusion of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by 
the EC/EU: Some Reflections from a “Constitutional” Perspective 
(University of Catania Online Working Paper No. 4, 2010) avail-
able at http://www.lex.unict.it/cde/quadernieuropei/serie_speciale/
diversita_culturale.asp.
12 Council of the European Union, Code of Conduct between the 
Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out internal  
arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the 
European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Doc. No. 16243/10 (Nov. 29, 
2010) available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/
st16/st16243.en10.pdf [hereinafter Code of Conduct].
13 CRPD, supra note 3, Art. 3(a), (c).
14 For a more detailed analysis see Anna Lawson, The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  
New Era or False Dawn? 34 sYracuse J. int’L L. & comm. 563, 
590 et. seq. (2007).
15 CRPD, supra note 3, Art. 4(4).
Endnotes continued on page 75 
competences — particularly in agreements like the CRPD where 
responsibilities are difficult to specify outright — is one key ele-
ment in the equation of deepening integration whilst respecting 
difference. Respecting and celebrating differences is of course 
the touchstone of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities itself, and that should be the ultimate end of crafting 
its place in EU law.
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